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Abstract 
 
The discourse of resilience has increasingly been utilised to advance the political prioritisation 
of enhanced security and to extend the performance of risk management in the 
Anthropocene. This has been notably advanced through integrated approaches that engage 
with uncertainty, complexity and volatility in order to survive and thrive in the future. Within 
this context, and drawing on findings from a number of EU-wide research projects tasked 
with operationalising critical infrastructure resilience, this paper provides a much- needed 
assessment of how resilience ideas are shaping how critical infrastructure providers and 
operators deal with complex risks to ‘lifeline’ systems and networks, whilst also illuminating 
the tensions elicited in the paradigm shift from protective-based risk management towards 
adaptive-based resilience. In doing so, we also draw attention to the implications of this 
transition for organisational governance and for the political ecologies of the Anthropocene 
that calls for more holistic, adaptable and equitable ways of assessing and working with risk 
across multiple systems, networks and scales.  
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Critical infrastructure lifelines and the politics of anthropocentric resilience 
For humanity to survive in the Anthropocene, we need to learn to live with and 
through the end of our current civilisation. Change, risk, conflict strife and death are 
the very processes of life, and we cannot avoid them. We must learn to accept and 
adapt.   
Roy Scranton, Learning to Die in the Anthropocene (2015, p.22) 
Resilience is the ability of a system to survive and thrive in the face of a complex, 
uncertain and ever-changing future. It is a way of thinking about both short term 
cycles and long term trends: minimizing disruptions in the face of shocks and stresses, 
recovering rapidly when they do occur, and adapting steadily to become better able to 
thrive as conditions continue to change. A resilience approach offers a proactive and 
holistic response to risk management. 
Siemens, Toolkit for Resilient Cities (2013, p.3) 
Introduction  
The Anthropocene can be viewed as an epoch which began in the mid-twentieth century 
through a rapid increase in technological change, population growth and consumption, and 
which is increasingly characterised by complex and dynamic system interaction, future 
volatility and ultimately an imperative to rethink the relationship of humans with nature, 
environment and technology. Concomitantly, in the early twenty-first century – catalysed by 
the devastating events of 9/11 and the release of the fourth Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) report in 2007 highlighting unequivocal evidence of a warming climate 
– ideas and practices of resilience have become a central organising metaphor within policy-
making processes and the expanding institutional framework of national security and 
emergency preparedness. For many, resilience offers an integrated approach for coping with 
all manner of disruptive events, as well as a new way to engage with future uncertainty 
(Chandler, 2014; Coaffee, Murakami Wood, & Rogers, 2008; Walker & Cooper, 2011; Zolli & 
Healy, 2013). As we will argue in this paper, resilience thinking has subsequently been utilised 
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to ‘extend’ established risk management approaches and to advance ways of surviving and 
thriving in the future through adaptation and long-term transformative action.  
In many ways it is the spectre of unanticipated catastrophe that has driven the interest in 
resilience as a universal remedy for a range of ‘natural’ and human-induced risks (Aradau & 
van Munster, 2011). Recent decades have been remarkable for the volume of high-impact 
anthropocentric disasters, such as the impact of Hurricane Sandy or the cascading effects 
following the Tohuku earthquake, and which have highlighted the vulnerability, complexity 
and interdependency of contemporary life. Pointing towards the new climatic norm of the 
Anthropocene, Fisher (2012, p. 3) has also highlighted the dramatic increase in ‘weather-
related catastrophes’, such as floods, storms and drought, which have increased 
exponentially between 1900 and 2005. These events have foregrounded the political 
prioritisation of enhanced security – often badged as resilience – as a political imaginary of 
being ‘insecurity by design’ (Evans & Reid, 2014). Such attention to governing insecurity has 
been highly related to historical and geographic contingency which sees governmental and 
corporate approaches to contingency planning, protection and resilience differentially 
applied in accordance to context (Lentzos & Rose, 2009). The frequency and severity of 
recent crises have further channelled attention to vulnerable physical assets, with a particular 
focus on critical infrastructure whose disruption have the potential to significantly affect 
public safety, security, economic activity, social functioning or environmental quality.  
Specifically post-9/11, there has been focus within security policy upon critical infrastructure 
protection using conventional risk management principles and on the interdependency and 
interoperability of these systems and, by extension, the cascading effects of a breakdown in 
one system on other interconnected systems.1 The increased acknowledgement of such 
complex risk has, over time, led to a prioritisation of critical infrastructure resilience. 
However, despite the clear parallels between the emergence of critical infrastructure and 
resilience as mainstream anthropocentric policy concerns, there has been relatively little 
interconnection between theory and practice. Emerging approaches to improving critical 
infrastructure resilience are still in their infancy, with e orts focused predominantly upon 
single infrastructure sectors, across a number of easily compared critical infrastructure 
sectors and at limited spatial scales.  
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Drawing on the results from a number of EU-wide research projects tasked with 
operationalising critical infrastructure resilience,2 this paper illuminates how resilience ideas 
are shaping the ways in which critical infrastructure providers deal with complex risk and the 
tensions elicited in the transition from protective-based risk management towards adaptive-
based resilience. In doing so, we will highlight the implications for this new way of working 
for organisational governance and for the importance of the political ecologies of the 
Anthropocene that call for more holistic and integrated ways of assessing risk and new 
modes of equitable governance across multiple systems, networks and scales (Biermann, 
2014; Crutzen & Stoermer, 2000).  
The remainder of the paper proceeds in three main sections. First, we frame our discussion 
through ideas of how to ‘survive’ anthropocentric challenges that require a different social–
spatial framing, politics and ways of adapting to uncertainty. Here we view resilience as a 
supposed antidote – a new biopolitical nomos – to such anthropocentric destabilisation and 
insecurity, in contrast to a conventional probabilistic ‘risk-based’ world. Second, we 
operationalise ideas of change brought about by the Anthropocene and resilience discourse 
through the lens of critical infrastructure assessment and illuminate a normative paradigm 
shift from protection towards resilience. Third, we draw the key themes of the paper 
together in articulating how future critical infrastructure operations will need to adapt to the 
challenges of uncertainty and system interdependences in the Anthropocene. Drawing on 
detailed empirical survey work across Europe with a range of critical infrastructure providers, 
we also illuminate a series of interrelated barriers that has made the operationalisation of 
resilience approaches di cult to achieve in practice.  
Survival in the Anthropocene  
The Anthropocene presents a new role for humanity as the driving force behind planetary 
systems whilst at the same time operating within a world of ‘persistent uncertainty’ 
(Biermann, 2014) – a condition where the broader security concerns of nations have been 
increasingly rewritten to secure the conditions necessary for human life, for our very survival 
as a species.  
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In 2000, Crutzen and Stoermer first suggested that human-generated changes to the 
biosphere, including climate change, urbanisation, the deployment of nuclear weapons, 
large-scale biodiversity loss and accelerating landscape transformation, were creating a new 
geological epoch which they termed, the Anthropocene. Most recently, in a seminal paper in 
Science, Waters et al. (2016) concluded that ‘the Anthropocene is functionally and strati- 
graphically distinct from the Holocene’, and began with the ‘Great Acceleration’ in the mid-
twentieth century. However, despite its geological basis, the Anthropocene has redefined 
critical human–environment relationships, the key role of risk in mediating this under- 
standing and illuminated how, in particular, the global climatic system is becoming more 
volatile, bringing new challenges for humanity (Oldfield et al., 2014). Despite dire warnings of 
increased storms, droughts and floods (IPCC, 2014), some suggest that the primary challenge 
will be political and in how humanity collectively builds adaptable governance systems that 
tackle the challenges of climate change and enhance resilience (Biermann et al., 2015). 
Whilst concerns over climate change are most commonly used to articulate the nature and 
the impact of the Anthropocene, it can also be considered a much wider conceptual frame 
for understanding human–environmental relationship and their political significance. 
However, there is a paradox at the heart of these understandings of the Anthropocene: 
whilst humans are increasingly shaping the environmental conditions, the ability to do this in 
a conscious and deliberate way is hampered by our inability to tackle the complex 
interactions and interdependencies involved, and thus the true nature of anthropocentric risk 
to global society.  
Managing anthropocentric risk 
Social scientists for many years have studied the risks from natural hazards and the need to 
make contingency against their impact (Kates, 1962; White, 1942). However, accounts 
regarding the impact of technological and anthropocentric risk only became prevalent in the 
late 1980s and 1990s, which suggested that concerns about such risks had become de ning 
societal characteristics (Adams, 1995; Beck, 1992; Douglas, 1994). This new range of ‘risk 
theory’ emerged primarily around concerns about global environmental hazards, the trans- 
national nature of such risk and the effect of such risk in challenging existing political 
governance configurations. Most notable amongst this canon of work was Beck’s (1992) Risk 
Society – Towards a New Modernity. Published in the wake of the Chernobyl nuclear 
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catastrophe in Ukraine, Risk Society considered what society might look like when disputes 
and conflicts about new types of risk produced by industrial society are fully realised.3 Risk 
Society starkly illuminated the magnitude and boundless nature of the global risks, and how 
this is transforming the way in which risk is imagined, assessed, managed and governed, but 
not eradicated. Beck’s work provided the impetus for further academic thought related to 
the impact of the emergence of a set of newly de ned and ubiquitous ‘mega-scale’ risks on 
the workings of global society that ‘cannot be delimited spatially, temporally, or socially’ 
(Beck, 1995, p. 1). As Giddens (2002, p. 34) reiterated:  
... whichever way you look at it, we are caught up in risk management. With the 
spread of manufactured risk, governments can’t pretend such management isn’t their 
business. And they need to collaborate, since very few new-style risks have anything to 
do with the borders of nations.  
Risk Society is a story of survivability. As Blowers (1999, p. 256) commented, ‘Risk Society is a 
pessimistic and conflictual diagnosis of modern societies ... that is exposed to risks from high 
technology ... that imperil our very survival’. new risk theory also further exposed the 
disenchanted world of formalised instrumental rationality abundant in the ‘iron cage’ of 
bureaucracy (Weber, 1958) and the absence of social and cultural factors involved in 
discussions about risk that had been hidden beneath a preference for objective approaches 
to risk assessment – the ‘possibility of calculation’ (Giddens, 2002, p. 28).  
These new understandings of risk are echoed in more recent discourses on the critical 
thresholds of the Anthropocene. For example, current attempts to tackle climate change 
have exposed the failures of contemporary decision-making, highlighting that ‘neither 
traditional risk management strategies nor conventional economic decision-making can be 
relied on to govern in the face of increasingly likely extreme events’ (Dalby, 2013a, p. 189). 
The Anthropocene ushers in an unknown future that requires policy-makers to shift their 
focus both from an appreciation of risk to one of criticality and in identifying and 
understanding those aspects essential for human well-being. This is particularly the case with 
regard to the long-term significance of system interdependencies and issues of social and 
spatial justice (Biermann, 2014; Dalby, 2013b; Mabey, Schultz, Dimsdale, Bergamaschi, & 
Amal-lee, 2013).  
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From risk to resilience 
The anthropocentric view of risk has significantly contributed to the rise of resilience as the 
policy metaphor of choice for coping with and managing future uncertainty and the 
incorporation of ‘the dynamic interplay between persistence, adaptability and 
transformability across multiple scales and time frames’ (Davoudi, 2012, p. 310). Whilst the 
concept of resilience is closely associated with an engagement with risk, a critical schism 
emerges between resilience and more established risk management practices (Baum, 2015; 
Suter, 2011); should resilience be considered as the end goal of traditional risk management 
approaches? Is it a new consideration for risk management? Does it extend current risk 
management practices? or does resilience require an entirely different paradigm for 
considering future uncertainties?  
The shift towards resilience approaches is also not without critique, posing some 
fundamental questions of resilience for whom, by whom? (Coaffee & Lee, 2016). Much of 
this critical assessment concerns the alleged tarnishing of resilience ideas through ‘neoliberal 
decentralisation’ (Amin, 2013) and a post-political landscape understood as the foreclosing of 
political choice, the delegation of decision-making to technocratic experts, growing public 
disengagement from politics and ultimately the closing down of political debate and agency 
(Flinders & Wood, 2014). The emerging canon of work in ‘critical resilience studies’ has high- 
lighted the ways in which resilience policy and practice indicate a shift in the state’s policies, 
reflecting a desire to step back from its responsibilities to ensure the protection of the 
population during crisis and to delegate to certain professions, private companies, 
communities and individuals.4 Through the lens of resilience policy, we can therefore chart 
new forms of precautionary governance, attempts to create resilient citizens, the drawing in 
of a range of stakeholders to the resilience agenda and the corresponding adoption of new 
roles and responsibilities in enacting policy priorities. Whilst we are sympathetic to critical 
accounts and especially their powerful expose of who wins and who doesn’t in neoliberal 
governance, we, like others, prefer to focus upon our analysis on a more inductive and 
performative approach which views resilience as a multiplicity of related, and often 
experimental practices. Like Brassett and Vaughan-Williams (2015, p. 34) in this paper we 
seek to reflect and develop upon a notion of resilience as an ongoing interaction 
between various (and often conflicting) actors and logics, one which can be viewed as 
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far more contingent, incomplete and contestable in both its characteristics and 
effects than is usually acknowledged in the existing literature.  
In resilience practice, as a consequence of anthropocentric uncertainty and the associated 
need to protect lifeline systems and infrastructures, there has been a growing interest in 
utilising the concept of resilience for critical infrastructure assurance. As Evans and Reid 
(2014, p. 18) note, ‘critical infrastructure is now central to understanding living systems’ and 
politically, the combined lifelines deemed necessary for security, survival and growth. But as 
Dalby (2013a) further argues, conventional approaches to designing critical infrastructure 
that leave too many key decisions to the market to decide are fundamentally awed, and 
policy-makers need to make large, far-reaching decisions if they are to avoid major disasters 
in the future. Moreover, the changing material politics, geographies and governance 
arrangements associated with critical infrastructure – the ‘collective equipment’ of state 
power (Foucault, Guattari, Deleuze, & Fourquet, 1996) by which control might be exerted, 
socio-economic restructuring advanced and inequity concretised – is also of critical concern. 
It is to such recent attempts to enhance the resilience of critical infrastructures that this 
paper now turns in order to articulate recent attempts to refocus the need to secure 
infrastructure through the lens of resilience rather than probabilistic risk management.  
Enhancing critical infrastructure resilience  
The last 20 years have been remarkable for the volume of high-impact crises, disasters and 
global incidents with the ability of providers to assure the security and continuity of infra- 
structure becoming of high importance. Critical infrastructure assurance is therefore 
progressively moving away from a focus upon protection towards emphasising resilience.5 It 
is perhaps the cascading effects of a breakdown in one system on other interconnected 
systems, which have provoked most significant concern – often articulated through the 
spectre of low probability–high consequence ‘Black Swan’ events. The failures of 
infrastructure illustrated during 9/11, the 2011 Tohuku earthquake in Japan or Hurricane 
Sandy in2012 upon new York, highlight the vulnerability and potential weaknesses of our 
critical systems and man-made infrastructure and how such failures often have common 
roots, particularly around path dependencies and institutional failings (Dueñas-osorio & 
Vemuru, 2009). Increasingly, infrastructural assemblages are being viewed as ‘complex 
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adaptive systems’ with an emphasis on the ability to adapt to such conditions of uncertainty 
and volatility (Comfort, 1994; Longstaff, 2005). In turn, this has catalysed the emergence of 
resilience as a way to assess the complex challenges that critical infrastructure faces as well 
as providing a potential framework by which to respond.  
 
As the critical infrastructure sector has become a larger, more complex and an increasingly 
interconnected amalgamation of social, technical and economic networks, so, the risk of 
breakdown has risen. The growing interest in applying resilience methods in securing critical 
infrastructure has grown as traditional risk management methodologies have proved 
ineffective in the face of growing complexity and the unpredictability of threats, and growing 
knowledge about interdependency and cascade effects amongst critical infrastructure sec- 
tors. In the Anthropocene, where such volatility is a leitmotiv and where security is being 
constantly recast as resilience, assuring the functioning of critical infrastructure against a 
range of known and unknown unknowns (notably the impacts of climate change being seen 
as an imminent security threat or threat multiplier) has become a core challenge of 
government. As Perelman (2007, p. 23) highlighted, in the post-9/11 age ‘the allure of 
resilience is stoked by the contradictions and thorny trade-o s inherent in traditional 
concepts of ‘national security’ in an age of increasing social-technical complexity, 
transnational ‘globalization,’ and ‘asymmetric’ conflict’. Moreover, as national/homeland 
security has been reconfigured, so previously irreconcilable socio-political objectives (e.g. 
security against attacks vs. security against natural disasters, disease, accidents, etc., and 
centralised command and control versus communal collaboration) increasingly come into 
focus (ibid.). As security ‘comes home’ and becomes more localised (Coaffee & Wood, 2006) 
so the impulse to completely eliminate risk and uncertainty and prevent harm is destabilised 
and security is recast. In many cases, the assumptions of positivist and instrumentally rational 
risk management have been turned on their head forcing the abandonment of the Modernist 
dream of total control, alongside a shift from traditional Euclidian, Cartesian and Westphalian 
notions of scale and territory.  
By contrast, the current push for resilience increasingly highlights the importance of sub-
national responses to new security challenges, ‘placing the needs of the individual, not states, 
at the centre of security discourses’ (Chandler, 2012, p. 214). Resilience-thinking is thus 
increasingly forcing operators of infrastructure to work with the irreducibility of risk and 
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uncertainty, to devise a range of alternative visions of the future, and to advance more 
deliberative and scalable methods that seek adaptation through flexibility and agility.  
 
At the crux of the move from critical infrastructure protection to critical infrastructure 
resilience has been a struggle between what Perelman (2007, p. 24) referred to as hard and 
soft paradigms of security. Here, the hard paradigm represents the path of conventional 
security policies and practices associated with prevention and resistance, whilst by contrast, 
the soft paradigm is associated with adaptation and resilience – a move away from 
technocratic and techno-rational approaches and towards more socially grounded 
transformative approaches (Coaffee & lee, 2016). Perelman (2007) further cites the work of 
influential American physicist Amory Lovins on future energy demand (Lovins, 1976) who 
highlighted the advantages of the soft resilient path over the hard brittle path:  
 
[T]he soft path appears generally more flexible – and thus robust. Its technical 
diversity, adapt- ability, and geographic dispersion make it resilient and offer a good 
prospect of stability under a wide range of conditions, foreseen or not. The hard path, 
however is brittle; it must fail, with widespread and serious disruption, if any of its 
exacting technical and social conditions is not satisfied continuously and indefinitely. 
(ibid, p. 88, emphasis added)  
 
Redefining the protectionist reflex through resilience 
In times of vulnerability there is a natural impulse to evoke a ‘protectionist re ex’ in order to 
ensure safety (Beck, 1999, p. 153). Such a reflex has been very evident in critical 
infrastructure protection programmes that have adopted approaches involving the 
‘hardening’ of critical assets to increase ‘resistance’ and ‘robustness’. Ironically, the net effect 
of such actions often leads to what are known as ‘robust-yet-fragile’ systems that are 
increasingly susceptible to unexpected threats and cascade failures (Carlson & Doyle, 2000). 
An opposing approach is taken by those emphasising the ‘soft’ – more resilient – path: ‘first, 
it takes a holistic view of ‘infrastructure’ as complex, dynamic, adaptive, even living systems, 
rather than discrete, concrete, fixed assets. And second, it aims at softening the brittleness of 
systems ...’ (Perelman, 2007, p. 28).  
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A protection-based approach to critical infrastructure is, in large part, a legacy of ingrained 
engineering-focused approaches to risk management, where an epistemic focus upon 
ordering and probability, a requirement for optimisation and control, and a near exclusion of 
social and human factors has created a very different reality from what is increasingly 
becoming known as resilience management. This emerging approach goes beyond risk 
management to address the complexities of large integrated systems and the uncertainty of 
future threats. As Linkov et al. (2014, p. 407) note, ‘... risk management helps the system 
prepare and plan for adverse events, whereas resilience management goes further by 
integrating the temporal capacity of a system to absorb and recover from adverse events, 
and then adapt’.  
In terms of governance, the application of risk management for critical infrastructure is 
traditionally premised on a command and control approach from central government, and 
actualised through meta-strategies linked to national security or emergency management.6 
Such a static and often short-term approach to complex governance is what classic ecological 
resilience theory identifies as a ‘rigidity trap’ where such management can lead to institutions 
lacking diversity and becoming highly connected, self-reinforcing and in flexible to change 
(Gunderson & Holling, 2002). In counter-response, and again drawing on established 
resilience ideas of Panarchy, ‘adaptive management’ is seen as necessary to enhance 
responsiveness, agility and resilience in interconnected systems. As such, we increasingly see 
critical infrastructure providers moving towards advancing horizontally integrated 
approaches where adaptability – ‘the dynamic capacity to effect and unfold multiple 
evolutionary trajectories ... which enhance the overall responsiveness of the system to 
unforeseen changes’ (Pike, Dawley, & Tomaney, 2010, p. 4) – is central to effective future 
action.  
Concomitant to the shifting nature of governmental control is the central nature of 
technology in decision-making and the continual quest for technological ‘silver bullets’ to 
help cope with new security challenges. Here, Perelman (2007, p. 39) argues that a more 
process-based viewpoint should dominate and that ‘in place of the hard path’s technocratic 
tunnel vision, the soft paradigm aims at investing in social-technical innovation processes ... 
[that] points toward managing technology and tangible infrastructure not as autonomous 
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‘assets’ but as dependent elements of complex, socioeconomic systems’.  
The resilience turn  
The so-called ‘resilience turn’ (Coaffee, 2013) in the early 2000s saw resilience approaches 
and initiatives embedded within an array of global initiatives, national policies and more local 
practices, notably critical infrastructure. In critical infrastructure, early attempts to mitigate 
vulnerabilities tended to utilise conventional risk management approaches that struggled 
with accounting for complexity and interdependencies, and socio-economic and 
organisational issues. The US was amongst the first nations to develop a national strategy for 
the identification, management and protection of critical infrastructure through the 1997 
President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CCIP) and has been at the fore- 
front of the shift from protection to resilience. The failures that followed the 9/11 attacks 
prompted a further addressing of vulnerabilities in the nation’s critical infrastructure 
preparedness. In 2002, the US Congress funded the creation of the Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (CIP) Project to undertake applied research on critical infrastructure and to 
anticipate and reflect changes in the national risk environment (Mayberry, 2013). 
Subsequently, a new way of perceiving and prioritising threats, vulnerabilities and 
consequences to critical infrastructures – based on ideas of resilience – was put in train in 
early 2006 when, in a presentation to the Homeland Security Advisory Committee (HSAC), 
the Critical Infrastructure Task Force (CITF) recommended ‘Critical Infrastructure Resilience’ 
as the top-level strategic objective – the desired outcome – to drive national policy and 
planning (Pommerening, 2007, p. 10). Most recently in the 2013 Presidential directives on 
‘national Preparedness’ (PPd-8) and on ‘Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience’ (PPd-
21) promote an all-hazards approach which stresses the importance of anticipating cascading 
impacts and high- lights the shared responsibility of critical infrastructure protection and 
resilience to all levels of government, the private sector and individual citizens (Obama, 
2013).  
The US policy chronology noted above is by no means unique amongst advanced nations 
illuminating how critical infrastructure policy in many countries is incrementally shifting from 
being protection-focused towards the more integrated resilience paradigm. However, in spite 
of this expanding interest in the vulnerability of critical infrastructure, there are only a very 
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small number of formal definitions for critical infrastructure resilience, currently in use. In the 
US, critical infrastructure resilience is now framed by the resilience cycle and defined as the 
‘ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a potentially disruptive 
event’ (DHS, 2009). By contrast, Australia has an ‘all hazards strategy’ that provides a 
foundation for collaboration and organisational resilience building rather than a probabilistic 
risk management framework. It is contended that this better enables owners and operators 
to prepare for and respond to a range of unpredictable or unforeseen disruptive events. This 
is underpinned by two core objectives that treat foreseeable and unforeseen risks differently: 
adopting either a mature risk assessment approach to foreseeable risks to the continuity of 
their operations that underpinned prior critical infrastructure protection programmes, or 
extending this into an approach focused upon resilience so that ‘critical infrastructure owners 
and operators are effective in managing unforeseen risks to the continuity of their operations 
through an organisational resilience approach’ (Australian Government, 2010, ibid, p. 14). 
This latter approach places an emphasis upon dealing with complexity and advancing 
adaptive capacities within organisations to respond to, recover from and prepare for a range 
of disruptive challenges.  
The transition in critical infrastructure resilience assessment  
Whilst there is no agreed international measurement approach for critical infrastructure 
resilience, there is broad agreement on why we need to measure it. Such agreement focuses 
upon being better able to characterise resilience in context and to articulate its key 
constituents so as to be better able to raise awareness of where interventions might be 
placed in order to build resilience within organisations and networks. This allows additional 
focus upon allocating resources for resilience in a transparent manner and more broadly to 
monitor policy performance, as well as to assess the effectiveness of resilience-building 
policy through comparison of policy goals and targets against outcomes (Prior & Hagmann, 
2013, pp. 4–5).  
This transition in critical infrastructure assurance from protection towards resilience can be 
represented as a continuous process of change, exemplified by the models of assessment 
adopted by critical infrastructure providers that are progressively shifting from a highly 
quantified metrics approaches towards emphasis on a cyclical and adaptive learning process. 
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Schematically, we can conceptualised this transition as a series of overlapping phases that 
seek to assure the continuation of critical infrastructure lifelines (Figure 1).  
Within this conceptualisation, phase 1 is characterised by approaches that focus upon highly 
technical considerations (e.g. physical or informational) within a single critical infra- structure 
sector (e.g. energy, water or transport), at limited spatial scales (e.g. solely critical 
infrastructure facilities) and has typically led to enhanced physical characteristics notably:  
• Robustness: the inherent strength or resistance in a system to withstand 
external demands without degradation or loss of functionality;   
• Redundancy: system properties that allow for alternate options, choices and 
substitutions under stress;   
• Resourcefulness: the capacity to mobilise needed resources and services in 
emergencies;   
• Rapidity: the speed with which disruption can be overcome and safety, 
services and financial stability restored (Bruneau et al., 2003).   
The technical emphasis of these critical infrastructure qualities understands resilience 
primarily as resisting and recovering from ‘known threats’. By focusing upon the protection, 
preservation and recovery of single assets, these efforts to achieve resilience have, all too 
often, failed to account for cascading effects, unexpected events or the more integrated 
underpinnings necessary for critical infrastructure resilience.  
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Figure 1. Transitions in critical infrastructure assurance.  
In an attempt to evolve these characteristics into a more integrated understanding, sub- 
sequent approaches (phase 2) have sought to consider a range of social, economic and 
organisational factors alongside easily quantified protective criteria. For example, O’Rourke 
(2007, p. 27) proposed a 4 × 4 matrix that maps the four ‘qualities’ of robustness, 
redundancy, resourcefulness and rapidity, against technical, organisational, social and 
economic factors (Figure 2).  
In a practical example, the US national Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) report that 
outlines resilience practices for the electricity sector utilised a similar approach around the 
headings of robustness, resourcefulness, rapid recovery and adaptability, subdivided into 
people and processes, infrastructure and assets and whether unintentional, intentional or 
cyber acts (NIAC, 2010). despite this advancement, there has been widespread comment 
about the limitations of such approaches, including the lack of meaningful social and 
organisational considerations, that these technical-focused initiatives discourage necessary 
adaption (Fisher & Norman, 2010) and that they are based upon a false idea of equilibrium 
and stability (Sikula, Mancillas, Linkov, & McDonagh, 2015). Notably, the measures utilised 
within typical phase 2 approaches are only measurable after an event has occurred.  
In response, a third phase of critical infrastructure assurance has evolved around the idea of 
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interdependent, network systems study; in effect adding an ‘anticipatory’ temporal 
dimension, including qualities that can be measured before an event or failure occurs (Linkov 
et al., 2014). For example, the US Army Corps of Engineers have produced a resilience 
measure (RM) consisting of a 4 × 4 matrix where one axis contains the major subcomponents 
of any system and the other axis lists the stages of a disruptive event (Figure 3).  
Collectively, these 16 cells provide a general description of the functionality of the system 
through an adverse event and assess resilience by assigning a score to each cell that reports 
the capacity of the system to perform in that domain and over time (Linkov, Larkin, & 
Lambert, 2015).  
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Dimension/Quality Technical  Organisational  Social  Economic 
Robustness Building codes 
and 
construction 
practices for 
new and 
retrofitted 
structures 
Emergency 
operations 
planning 
Social 
vulnerability 
and degree of 
community 
preparedness 
Extent of 
regional 
economic 
diversification 
Redundancy Capacity for 
technical 
substitutions 
and “work-
arounds” 
Alternate sites 
for managing 
disaster 
operations 
Availability of 
housing options 
for disaster 
victims 
Ability to 
substitute and 
conserve 
needed inputs 
Resourcefulness Availability of 
equipment and 
materials for 
restoration and 
repair 
Capacity to 
improvise, 
innovate, and 
expand 
operations 
Capacity to 
address human 
needs 
Business and 
industry 
capacity to 
improvise 
Rapidity System 
downtime, 
restoration time 
Time between 
impact and 
early recovery 
Time to restore 
lifeline services 
Time to regain 
capacity, lost 
revenue 
 
Figure 2. Matrix of critical infrastructure resilience qualities (adapted from O’Rourke, 2007).  
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 Prepare  Absorb  Recover  Adapt  
Physical      
Informatio
n      
Cognitive      
Social       
 
Figure 3. A resilience measure for critical infrastructure (adapted from Linkov et al., 2015)  
Whilst phase 2 and 3 assessment methodologies have been advanced as workable 
mechanisms for resilience assessment and as a basis for making decisions about protective 
measures, they remain technologically orientated and facility-focused, with an assessment 
approach relying on workable yet cost and time intensive procedures performed via 
accompanying software. Despite this increasing sophistication of approaches to assessing 
critical infrastructure resilience, they have struggled to include ‘organisational beliefs and 
rationalisations’ (Boin & McConnell, 2007, p. 56) and the path dependencies that have been 
increasingly identified as key barriers to enhanced resilience. It is these facets that have 
become central to an emerging fourth phase transition where organisational resilience is a 
key consideration and is understood as a property of an organisation that allows it to adapt 
proactively, following appropriate risk and resilience assessments. In some contexts, critical 
infrastructure operators are beginning to future-proof their decision-making by advancing a 
range of dynamic adaptive policy pathways in response to deep uncertainties about the 
future that can no longer be predicted by using traditional foresight and risk assessment 
methods. As Haasnoot, Kwakke, Walker, and ter Maat (2013, p. 485) highlight:  
They develop a static ‘optimal’ plan using a single ‘most likely’ future (often based on the 
extrapolation of trends) or a static ‘robust’ plan that will produce acceptable outcomes in 
most plausible future worlds ... However, if the future turns out to be different from the 
hypothesized future(s), the plan is likely to fail.  
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Organisations need more than a Plan A. By contrast, an adaptation pathways approach 
provides an analytical approach – a form of ‘iterative risk management’ – to explore a set of 
possible actions based on alternative developments over time. Such an approach highlights 
potential lock-ins, path dependencies and tipping points which specify the conditions under 
which a pre-specified action to change the plan is to be taken (Coaffee & lee, 2016; 
Haasnoot, Middelkoop, Offermans, van Beek, & van Deursen, 2012; Kwadijk et al., 2010). 
Whist such an approach is not novel in resilience studies with work focusing on experiential 
learning and adaptation central to ideas of adaptive management which formed the 
cornerstone of classic ecological resilience theory current adaptation pathway approaches 
take this one step further in grounding their work in the interdependencies and complexity of 
multiple interlocking infrastructures whilst presenting alternative ways of getting to a desired 
end point in the future. A focus upon such adaptation pathway processes essentially 
mainstreams resilience-thinking, adaptation and sometimes transformation into 
infrastructure planning rather than relying on short-term, incremental changes that will, in 
most cases, fail to shift organisation custom and practice from a protective risk-based mind-
set.  
Internationally, such an approach has been advanced predominantly in response to cli- mate 
change, notably by the IPCC, who in a 2014 report, advanced the idea of climate resilient 
pathways (Figure 4): ‘sustainable-development trajectories that combine adaptation and 
mitigation to reduce climate change and its impacts ... [including] iterative processes to 
ensure that effective risk management can be implemented and sustained’ (IPCC, 2014, p. 
87). Such pathways can be either progressive or regressive; either leading to a more resilient 
world through adaptation and learning, or lower resilience as a result of insufficient 
mitigation and failure to learn; and which can be irreversible in terms of possible futures 
(ibid, p. 88).  
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Figure 4: Opportunity spaces and climate resilient pathways (adapted from IPCC, 2014) 
In another example, adaptation pathway ideas have been fully integrated into the Dutch 
Adaptive delta Management (ADM) approach to enhancing climate resilience which seeks to 
be ‘anticipative’ of future conditions and stop ‘tipping points’ being reached. In the ADM has 
sought to understand how resilience ideas are shaping the ways in which critical infra- 
structure providers deal with complex risk, and the tensions elicited in the transition from 
protective approaches towards approaches founded on the basis of greater resiliency and 
how such assessment can be both accurate and fit of purpose.8 An analysis of the survey 
data illuminates a range of barriers to implementation that we can categorise as knowledge, 
assessment and/or operational barriers. First, knowledge barriers that were identified in our 
survey notably included the lack of a clear practical definition of resilience, difficulties of 
information sharing between providers that hindered joint-working, and the lack of 
integration of resilience-type ideas within established assessment tools and methods. 
Second, resilience assessment barriers included a perceived difficulty in evaluating the impact 
of resilience measures that might be introduced, particularly where the cost–benefit analysis 
was not clear, as well as concerns around sharing of sensitive information with other 
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organisations (a key part of advancing a critical infrastructure resilience approach is to 
develop a way of governing where providers and operators of multiple infrastructures work 
together for mutual benefit).  
Together, these knowledge and assessment barriers typically combined with shortcomings in 
institutional infrastructure and serve to create a range of organisational barriers to the 
operationalisation of resilience practice. Here, the focus of many critical infrastructure 
operators is on developing a ‘culture of resilience’, which normalises and mainstreams 
resilience practice, and enhances so-called organisational resilience – ‘the ability of an 
organization to anticipate, prepare for, and respond and adapt to incremental change and 
sudden disruptions in order to survive and prosper’.9 Here our research data illuminated 
strong resistance to changing organisational culture amongst many providers as a result of a 
paucity of guidance and corresponding technical know-how, as well as the human resources 
to facilitate resilience, a disinterest of managers in perusing a ‘resilience agenda’ (with 
resilience often perceived as a passing buzzword), and the absence of any regularly 
framework that prescribed and could be used to enforce change. From a more operational 
focus, many providers also reported difficulty in making a (financial) case for enhancing 
system redundancy – a key component of enhancing system resilience – and perpetual 
problems of balancing the requirement for short term efficiency and optimisation with the 
need to pro- vide resilience through flexibility and adaptability to cope with unexpected 
disruption.  
 
Towards an extended and equitable ecology of anthropocentric resilience 
In her critique of how states respond to low probability–high consequence events – an 
increasingly common feature of the Anthropocene – Amoore (2013, p. 60) highlighted the 
ways in which new forms of risk calculus has extended traditional risk management 
approaches based on probabilities by advancing a ‘politics of possibly’. As she noted,  
the emerging security risk calculus is not a more advanced form of abstraction than 
one might find in statistical or prudential modes, but rather it is a specific form of 
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abstraction that distinctively coalesces more conventional forms of probabilistic risk 
assessment with inferred and unfolding futures.  
This does not infer a seismic break with tradition, but rather a transitionary process by which 
more intuitive and adaptively focused processes underpinning resilience are laminated over 
the calculative rationality of conventional risk management and assessment methodologies. 
In this paper, we have outlined such an ongoing transition towards resilience in critical 
infrastructure operations, highlighting the difficulties inherent in this process and the dearth 
of agreed ways forward within the sector. As Suter (2011, p. 5) noted, ‘it remains often 
unclear if and to what extent the introduction of resilience changes the existing practices of 
critical infrastructure protection’. Moving from rhetoric to implementation in critical 
infrastructure, resilience is therefore not without its challenges and thus acknowledging and 
actualising how the role of resilience could drastically improve the security landscape for 
many critical infrastructure owners and operators, within their own context, is therefore 
crucial. Current practice in resilience assessment and promotion for critical infrastructure is 
too often limited to specific, endogenous technical factors. Unlike protection, resilience is not 
easily definable across all infrastructures, nor is it accurately measurable. As Pommerening 
(2007, p. 18) highlighted, ‘there is a curious disconnect between recommending coping and 
adaptation strategies for new stages of stability, and the fact that we have just as little 
knowledge about how those stages will look’.  
It can be seen from the foregoing discussion and emerging findings presented in this paper 
that there is a pressing need to address the shortcomings of traditional ‘siloed’ thinking and 
more ‘traditional’ views of ‘hard’ critical infrastructure protection that seeks bounce back to a 
pre-shock state rather than advancing more evolutionary ‘bounce forward’ pathways that 
seek to construct an approach more applicable to coping with increasingly complex and non-
linear systems. This reflects a wider journey from the traditional, techno-rational approach 
with prescriptive, rigid methodologies, to a wider socially and organisationally informed 
extension of risk management that seeks a more transformative understanding of critical 
infrastructure resilience. Figure 5, provides a summary of this transition through number of 
criteria by which the appropriateness of protection measures versus resilience measures 
could be assessed.  
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Whilst enhancing critical infrastructure resilience is of vital concern given the nature of 
anthropocentric risk, we need to remain cognisant of its potentially inequities. Critical infra- 
structure resilience is not purely technocratic or value neutral and can have significant 
impacts upon social and spatial justice across a range of interlocking scales as new 
approaches, processes, actors and technologies are pulled together and deployed in the 
name of resilience. As Fainstein (2015, p. 157) notes, resilience in certain situations 
‘obfuscates underlying conflict and the distribution of benefits resulting from policy choices’. 
Critical infrastructure is far from inanimate and is increasingly imbued with agency (Evans & 
Reid, 2014, p. 19). While often critical infrastructure resilience is masked in highly technical 
models showing complexity and indeterminacy there is a need to more fully engage with 
‘softer’ approaches emphasising such agency, that, to date have been missing from critical 
infra- structure assessment and future planning. As such we should seek ‘greater resilience of 
the whole, not just of what may be bureaucratically or politically deemed ‘critical’ to certain 
limited interests’ (Perelman, 2007, p. 40). Moreover, the advance of softer approaches, more 
grounded in social science methodologies, can assist critical infrastructure providers under- 
stand the complex multi-scalar and multi-institutional context in which they operate. As 
recent work on what has been termed ‘resilience multiple’ reminds us, context is vital and 
understanding how different perspectives and expertise in relation to resilience can be 
hybridised, and can help reconcile ‘the tension between a desire for open, non-linearity on 
the one hand and a mission to control and manage on the other’ as well as how different 
adoptions of resilience invoke ‘differing spatialities, temporalities and political implications’ is 
vital (Simon & Randalls, 2016, p. 3). Such a combinational approach also talks to ongoing 
discussions about the changing nature of expertise linked the new zeitgeist of resilience. In 
current mobilisations within the critical infrastructures sector providers are confronting 
complex risk, necessitating that required expertise has to become more di use, pluralistic and 
integrative. This is leading to many viewpoints, methodologies and ‘ways of doing’ resilience 
being combined in operationalising it in practice. Given the slow nature of organisational 
change, this will however take time, patience and a willingness to embrace change and 
difference across the critical infrastructure sector. In particular it will require an inculcation 
and adoption of certain values, practices and research methodologies that focus upon more 
than the instrumentally rational and embraces adaptation, flexibility and grounded 
approaches that are more sociologically and politically informed.  
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  Critical Infrastructure 
Protection 
Critical Infrastructure 
Resilience 
Aim Equilibrium 
Existing normality 
Preserve 
Stability 
Adaptive 
New normality 
Transformative 
Flexible 
Focus Endogenous 
Short term 
Reactive 
Hardened structures 
Exogenous 
Long-term 
Proactive 
Redesigned processes 
Critical 
Infrastructure 
Approaches 
Techno-rational 
Technical 
Homogeneity 
Robustness 
Recovery  
Fail-safe 
Protection 
Optimisation  
Single-sector focus 
Complex adaptive 
Socio-technical 
Heterogeneity 
Malleable 
Realign 
Safe-to-fail 
Predictive 
Greater redundancy/diversity 
Dependencies 
 
Figure 5. Differences between critical infrastructure protection and critical infrastructure 
resilience.  
Orchestrating such a coherent, sociotechnical and integrated approach to meeting the 
generational challenge of building resilient infrastructure is a significant challenge 
confronting the Anthropocene – and its academic theoreticians – over the coming decades. 
This is starkly represented in the Un Sustainable development Goals (SDGs) released in 
September 2015 where the discourse of resilience is utilised to highlight how global society 
should respond proactively to a range of shocks and stress and how we might collectively 
operationalise a joined-up response through developing ‘quality, reliable, sustainable and 
resilient infrastructure’ (Target 9.1) in order to advance global sustainable development.  
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Notes  
1. A further result of this trend has been the expansion of infrastructures considered to be 
critical and which has seen a shift from the line-based systems of public utilities, to more 
complex social infrastructures which safeguard the wellbeing of citizens and private 
enterprises performing societally significant roles.   
2. See acknowledgements for details.   
3. Risk Society was first published in German as Risikogesellschaft in 1986.   
4. Such a Foucauldian-inspired interpretation argues that resilience encourages individuals 
to  autonomously act in the face of a crisis and which precipitates citizens behaving and 
adapting according to prescribed moral standards (Joseph, 2013). As Welsh (2014, p. 16) 
highlighted, resilience policy is ‘a post-political ideology of constant adaptation attuned to 
the uncertainties of neoliberal economy where the resilient subject is conceived as 
resilient to the extent it adapts to, rather than resists, the conditions of its suffering’.   
5. Not all infrastructure is deemed to be ‘critical’, and thus infrastructure can be categorised 
using some form of ‘criticality’ scale to assess its value and the impact of its 
loss/disruption.   
6. Many commentators argued that after 9/11 many states responded by returning to or 
reinforcing authoritarian command and control types approaches to managing aspects of 
emergency management or what was increasingly termed resilience (see for example, 
Alexander, 2002).   
7. The formation of adaptation pathways are linked to the acknowledgement of uncertainty 
in climate change and thus bases much of its thinking on a scenario matrix which looks at 
the linkages between climate change and socio-economic development.   
8. This research was carried out by way of two large-scale surveys of 40 + critical 
infrastructure operator’s across Europe in 2015 and 2016. These surveys were conducted 
as part of the work underpinning the EU funded RESIlEnS project in which the authors 
were seeking to undertake a gap analysis of the current approaches to risk and resilience 
management within the infrastructure sector.  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9. This definition comes from the recently published British Standard on organisational 
Resilience (2014).  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